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Abstract
An important feature of financial markets is that securities are traded
repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors. We study how current
and future adverse selection affect the required return. We find that the
bid-ask spread generated by adverse selection is not a cost, on average, for
agents who trade, and hence the bid-ask spread does not directly influence the
required return. Adverse selection contributes to trading-decision distortions,
however, implying allocation costs, which affect the required return. We
explicitly derive the effect of adverse selection on required returns, and show
how our result differs from models that consider the bid-ask spread to be an
exogenous cost.
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Understanding the equilibrium expected return — the required return —
on securities is the fundamental goal of asset pricing. Of the various fac-
tors influencing the required return, this paper concentrates on the fact that
market participants are asymmetrically informed, and, importantly, they will
also be so at later trading times. What are the costs implied by present and
future asymmetric information, and how are they priced? Should a buyer,
for instance, offer a reduced price because she would later sell in a market
plagued by adverse selection?
In related work, Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1988) consider the effect
of exogenous transaction costs. They show that the price of an asset is
reduced by the present value of all future trading costs. Said differently,
the required return on a security is increased by the per-period transaction
cost.1 In empirical work, the bid-ask spread is often taken as a proxy for this
trading cost.2
We endogenize trading costs as a result of asymmetric information and ob-
tain two main results. First, the required return is elevated by the per-period
costs associated with allocation inefficiencies caused by adverse-selection prob-
lems.
Second, if agents are symmetric ex ante, then future bid-ask spreads
are not a direct trading cost. (Of course, they contribute to the allocation
inefficiencies, which are priced as stated by the first result.) That is, their
present value does not directly reduce the price — unlike in the case of
exogenous trading costs. This result obtains because, in expectation, the
future losses an agent will incur when trading due to liquidity reasons are
balanced by the gains he will make when trading based on information. If
the agents differ ex ante, though, in that some agents are more likely to make
liquidity trades than others, then the marginal investor does not break even
on average and her expected net trading losses augment the required return.
Our paper is related to the literature studying asymmetric information
that follows Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985). While these im-
portant papers analyze, among other things, the mechanism determining the
bid-ask spread, they cannot address the pricing of future adverse selection.
The reason is that these frameworks are characterized by the presence of in-
finitely liquid agents, who face no risk of a future need to liquidate positions
1See also Constantinides (1986), Vayanos (1998), and Vayanos and Vila (1999).
2See, for instance, Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989), Eleswarapu and Reinganum
(1993), Chen and Kan (1996), and Eleswarapu (1997).
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in adverse markets. As a consequence, the required return equals the risk-
free return. It is the elimination of these deep-pocketed agents that leads to
our results. Our assumption is motivated by the factual observation that in
most markets the liquidity of the participants, including market makers,3 is
limited, and agents are subject to such liquidity events as financial distress,
hedging or re-balancing needs, tax considerations, agency constraints, etc.
Given the possibility of having to liquidate a security position, an agent con-
siders the (allocation) costs associated with the adverse selection prevailing
in the market at the future time at which he may need to sell. Moreover, a
future buyer also anticipates (allocation) costs when she needs to sell, and
so on for the life of the asset.
The model works as follows. A finite number of risk-neutral agents may
each own one or zero of a finite set of shares of an asset. Each period, every
owner receives a dividend. Then, a randomly chosen agent receives two
private signals: one about the next dividend, and one conveying whether he
has a (private) cost or benefit of holding the asset (a “liquidity shock”). After
these signals are received, all agents can submit market or limit orders, and
trade occurs at a market-clearing price. In equilibrium, uninformed owners
submit limit orders to sell at the same price, which we call the ask price,
uninformed non-owners submit limit orders to buy, at a price that we call
the bid price, and an informed agent submits a market order or no order.
Limit orders are subject to adverse selection. As a result, the bid price
is affected by the well-known “lemons” discount: A market order to sell is a
bad signal to other market participants because they know that it may be
due to adverse information, which leads to a discounted bid price. Similarly,
a buyer-initiated trade is good news to the market, and hence it is associated
with an analogous premium for the ask price. The sum of these discount and
premium constitutes the bid-ask spread.
Our key result, with agent symmetry, is that the adverse-selection dis-
count and premium result in zero expected net costs to trading agents.
Hence, if the bid-ask spread is generated by adverse selection, then the re-
quired return is not directly affected by bid-ask spreads. (Adverse selection
has an indirect allocation effect, as described below.)
The intuition for this result is as follows. An agent who is selling for
liquidity reasons is paid too little relative to his information about the asset
3Indeed, many market makers prefer limited positions overnight, and, in some markets,
serve merely as “matchmakers.”
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value, whereas an agent selling for information reasons is paid too much, as
shown by Bagehot (1971), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985). In
equilibrium, these effects offset each other. Hence, if an agent may trade for
either liquidity reasons or information reasons in the future — as is the case
in our model — he anticipates a future net trading loss of zero. This paper
innovates by considering the price impact of future asymmetric information,
rather than the extensively studied phenomenon that current asymmetric
information gives rise to a bid-ask spread.4
While not a direct trading cost, adverse selection leads to an allocation
cost associated with inefficient decisions to buy or sell. This allocation cost
is incurred, for instance, when an owner needs cash, but has such good news
about the asset value that he (rationally) chooses not to sell. We show that
the price of an asset is reduced by the present value of all future net allocation
costs, or, equivalently, that the required return is increased by the per-period
relative allocation cost.
To summarize, adverse selection increases the required return through its
allocation costs, not directly through the bid-ask spread. This is consistent
with the findings of Easley, Hvidkjær, and O’Hara (2002) that cross-sectional
returns are explained by the probability of informed trading, but not by the
bid-ask spread.
To study the robustness and limitations of our results, we consider several
extensions of the basic model: (i) a model with investors that differ in their
likelihoods of becoming informed or of having liquidity needs, (ii) a model
with both fixed costs and informational costs, and (iii) a model with risk-
averse agents. In the latter two extensions, our main result holds: Adverse
selection affects the required return through the allocation costs.
In the first extension, with multiple types of investors, the required return
is additionally affected by the marginal investors’ expected trading losses.
These trading losses occur because a marginal investor is less likely to trade
on information than are the best informed investors. Unless the marginal
investor trades only for liquidity reasons, though, these losses are smaller
than the bid-ask spread.
This paper contributes to the literature on allocation inefficiencies related
4In a similar spirit, note that the seminal paper of Akerlof (1970) studies the way
adverse selection affects the market for used cars, leaving open the question of how the
prices of new cars are affected by the (anticipated) adverse-selection problems arising after
the car is used.
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to adverse selection.5 In particular, Ausubel (1990) and Eisfeldt (1999) show
that real investments in capital are affected by adverse selection, and Dia-
mond and Verrecchia (1991), Wang (1993), and Easley and O’Hara (2000)
find that asymmetric information leads to imperfect risk-sharing, resulting
in reduced prices.6 We find a similar result. Our simple setting allows us,
however, to determine explicitly how future allocation inefficiencies affect
prices.
Finally, by isolating the components of future trading costs associated
with asymmetric information and characterizing the present value of these
costs, comparing them across different settings, we complement the body
of literature — including Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Admati (1985), Wang (1993,
1994) — that studies asymmetric information in competitive markets in the
rational expectations equilibrium setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the basic
model, Section 2 presents our results concerning adverse selection, Section 3
develops our extensions, and Section 4 concludes.
1 Model
In this section we construct a simple model in which a finite set, N =
{1, . . . , N}, of identical risk-neutral agents trade in each of periods 0, 1, . . . , T−
1 ≤ ∞. We assume that there are K shares of the same asset, with K > 2
and N − K > 2. Each agent may own one share or no share. Hence, we
abstract from the investors’ quantity decisions (as do others, such as Glosten
and Milgrom (1985)). While this is a major restriction, it will be clear that
the intuition applies more generally.
[ FIGURE 1 HERE ]
The timing of events in any period, t, is shown in Figure 1. First, all
current owners of an asset receive a dividend. Then, one randomly chosen
agent, I(t) ∈ N , receives private information, xt+1 and σt+1. The signals xt+1
and σt+1 are independent random variables defined on a given probability
5Allocation inefficiency due to adverse selection arises in several corporate finance pa-
pers such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999),
and DeMarzo (2000).
6See also Akerlof (1970) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999).
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space (Ω,F , P r), such that (xt, σt) is i.i.d. over time.
7 The distribution of
(xt+1, σt+1) is common knowledge. The signal xt+1 has a strictly positive
density on (x, x) (where x < x are real numbers) and provides information
about the dividend next period, t+1. Specifically, we assume that agent I(t)
alone knows that the conditional expected value of the dividend next period
is xt+1. Our risk-neutrality assumption implies that the conditional utility
of an uninformed agent holding the asset is also xt+1. The signal σt+1 is
assumed to have a log-concave density and conveys information about agent
I(t)’s liquidity needs in this period. We model agent I(t)’s liquidity needs
by assuming that his utility from holding the asset this period is
xt+1 + σt+1.
We note that agent I(t)’s utility from holding the asset this period is lower
(higher) than the utility derived by the other agents if σt+1 < 0 (σt+1 > 0).
There are several ways of interpreting the shocks and, more generally, the
agents’ preferences. For instance, we may assume that there are two goods
in the economy: the dividend, which is non-storable and about which agents
may receive preference shocks, and the numeraire, which can be invested at
the same rate as the agents’ subjective discount rate. Another interpreta-
tion, more appropriate for financial assets, is that there is a carrying cost (or
benefit) to holding the asset, a cost which may suffer temporary shocks. Such
costs could be, among others, financing costs, tax implications, hedging ben-
efits (in a version of the model with risk-averse agents), or could derive from
a fund manager’s need to re-balance because of in- or out-flows of capital.
Thus, a negative σt+1 could represent a need for cash, a high financing cost,
or a reduced need for the asset, while a positive σt+1 a state of excess cash, a
low financing cost, or an extraordinary need for the asset. We focus on this
financial-market interpretation, except in Section 3.3, where the two-good
interpretation is more natural.
We note that it is not important for the results of the paper that a
dividend signal and a potential liquidity shock be received during the same
period, or by the same agent. What matters is that a trade may originate
either from liquidity needs or information.
7 We can extend the model to allow the distribution of (xt, σt), that is, the market
characteristics, to change (randomly) over time. In each period, there would be a public
signal about the current state of economy. See Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (1999) for a general
model with this feature.
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After agent I(t) has received his private information, there may be trade.
The trading mechanism is designed to resemble, stylistically, the opening
procedure at the New York Stock Exchange.8 Every agent can submit a
limit or market order to buy or sell one share. A limit order specifies a
price at which the agent is willing to buy or sell one share (this period), and
a market order is interpreted as a limit order with a price of plus or minus
infinity. Orders are executed as follows. First, the “specialist” determines the
set of prices at which supply equals demand, or at which any excess supply
or demand is due to orders at this price. It is easy to see that this set is an
interval. The mid point of this interval is denoted the clearing price.9 Then,
all trades are executed at the clearing price. If there is an excess supply or
demand at the clearing price, then a randomization scheme determines which
orders are executed.10
Having described the economy and agents’ possible actions, we now define
formally an equilibrium in this trading game. A strategy for agent i is defined
as a process A =
(
At
)T−1
t=0
, where At : Ω → {buy} × (−∞,∞] ∪ {sell} ×
[−∞,∞) ∪ {no trade} is measurable with respect to the information,11 F it ,
available to player i at time t. A strategy to play, for instance, the action
(buy, 17) means that the agent submits a limit order to buy one share for at
most $17. A strategy, A, for agent i is said to be feasible if At ∈ {sell} ×
[−∞,∞) only if agent i is an owner of an asset at the beginning of period t,
and if At ∈ {buy} × (−∞,∞] only if agent i is a non-owner.
At time t, agent i chooses a strategy that maximizes the present value of
his future cash flows, given that agent j plays strategy Aj for all j ∈ N , that
8Since only one agent is privately informed each period, the trading mechanism is
not crucial for our results. One important difference between our model and the NYSE,
however, is that the specialist in our model does not take a position.
9This interval is always bounded in equilibrium, but to fully describe the game, we must
also specify the clearing price in the case of an unbounded interval of possible clearing
prices: If this interval is bounded below (above), we let the clearing price be the lowest
(highest) element of the interval. If the interval is not bounded above nor below (that is,
if there are no limit orders at all) then the clearing price is set at some pre-specified value.
10This can be interpreted as follows. Orders arrive in a random order, and priority is
given based on time of arrival.
11Here, F it is the σ-algebra generated by
(x1, σ1, auction0, . . . , xt, σt, auctiont−1, xt+1 1(I(t)=i), σt+1 1(I(t)=i)),
where auctions includes the limit orders at time s, and the outcome of that auction.
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is, agent i maximizes
Πit(A
1, . . . , AN ) = (1)
E
[ T∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
xs + σs 1(i=I(s−1))
)
1(i∈Os) −
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tzis
∣∣∣∣ F it
]
,
where zis is the net cash payment
12 (due to sales or purchases of the asset)
made by agent i at time s, Os ⊂ N is the set of owners, and δ > 0 is the
agents’ subjective time-discount factor.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a set of feasible strategies, A = (A1, . . . , AN),
for the respective agents in N , such that, for all i ∈ N ,
E
(
Πi0(A)
)
≥ E
(
Πi0(A
1, · · · , Ai−1, A′, Ai+1, · · · , AN)
)
, (2)
for all strategies A′ feasible for agent i.
Since we are interested in adverse selection, not in reputation effects, we
consider only (symmetric) Markov equilibria, that is, equilibria in which any
agent’s strategy at time t is a function of whether or not he is an owner, and, if
he is informed, of (xt, σt). Consequently, the agents’ optimal strategies can be
characterized using dynamic programming with the ownership status as the
only state variable. To do this we define continuation-value functions. The
continuation value at time t, after the dividend is paid and before information
is received, is denoted by St for the owners and by Bt for the non-owners.
That is,
St = E
(
Πit(A)
∣∣ i owner at time t) (3)
Bt = E
(
Πit(A)
∣∣ i non-owner at time t) . (4)
2 Asymmetric Information and the Required
Return
In this section we solve for the equilibrium and determine how asset prices, or,
equivalently, required returns, are affected by the adverse-selection problem.
12More precisely, zis is defined as follows. If agent i sells (buys) at time s with a clearing
price of Ps, then z
i
s = Ps (z
i
s = −Ps), and z
i
s = 0 if agent i does not trade.
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We analyze the symmetric equilibrium in which all uninformed owners
submit the same limit order to sell, which we call the ask price, and all
uninformed non-owners submit the same limit order to buy, which we call
the bid price.13 The informed agent submits a market order or refrains from
trading.
To determine the exact strategies, we consider first the bid price that un-
informed non-owners offer, taking as given the behavior of the informed agent
and of the owners. An uninformed non-owner does not submit a market or-
der — as we later show formally — because of the adverse-selection problem.
Instead, each uninformed non-owner submits a limit order to buy one share
at his reservation value (as in Bertrand competition). The reservation value
is the expected next dividend conditional on a sale by the informed owner,
plus the value of being an owner next period, reduced by the (opportunity
cost associated with the) value of being a non-owner next period. Hence, the
bid price is
bidt = δ (xˆ + St+1 −Bt+1) , (5)
where xˆ = E(xt+1
∣∣ sale ) is the expected next dividend given that the
informed owner submits a market order to sell. (This informal definition of
xˆ is made precise in Equation (7).)
Now, consider an informed owner’s decision. If he wants to sell, then
the best price he can get is the bid price since all the non-owners submit
limit orders. Therefore, his decision comes down to keeping the asset or
submitting a market order to sell.14 He sells if and only if this gives him a
higher continuation value than that obtained by keeping the asset, that is, if
bidt + δBt+1 ≥ δ(xt+1 + σt+1 + St+1),
which is simplified using (5) to
xt+1 + σt+1 ≤ xˆ. (6)
13It can be shown that there are no equilibria in which all uninformed owners or non-
owners place market orders. Thus, in all other symmetric equilibria, uninformed non-
owners or uninformed owners (or both) place no order at all. The equilibrium that we focus
on is thus the most efficient symmetric equilibrium, and essentially the only symmetric
equilibrium in which uninformed agents may buy as well as sell.
14Of course, he could equivalently submit a low sell-limit order that hits the buy-limit
orders. We consider this the same as a market order.
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Hence, an informed owner sells if his news about the dividend is worse than
a cut-off level, which depends on his liquidity need.
Given these strategies, equilibrium is characterized by the condition that
the uninformed non-owners’ expectations are consistent with an informed
owner’s actions, that is,
xˆ = E
(
xt+1
∣∣ xt+1 + σt+1 ≤ xˆ ) , (7)
where the right-hand side is well-defined if Pr(xt+1 + σt+1 ≤ xˆ) > 0, and
otherwise we define it as the lower bound, x, of the support of xt+1. The
following proposition derives some important properties of xˆ; the full char-
acterization of the equilibrium is given in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 1 (i) There exists a solution to (7). (ii) Any solution is in the
interval [x, µ], where µ = E(xt). (iii) If Pr(σt < 0) = 0, the only solution
is x; otherwise all solutions are in (x, µ]. (iv) µ is a solution if and only if
Pr(σt ∈ (−∞,−(x− µ)]) > 0 and Pr(σt ∈ (−(x− µ), µ− x]) = 0.
The first part of Proposition 1 shows that there always exists an equilibrium
(subject to our later verification that only informed agents place market
orders). The second part shows that, in equilibrium, the expected next
dividend conditional on a market order to sell is lower than the average
dividend because of the adverse-selection problem. The third part shows
that, if there is no liquidity reason to sell, the adverse selection leads to a
market breakdown as in Akerlof (1970), but with liquidity motives to sell,
trade happens in equilibrium. The fourth part shows that there is a real
adverse-selection problem (xˆ < µ) unless all liquidity shocks are so large that
an informed owner with a negative liquidity shock always sells (regardless of
his information about the dividend) and an informed with a positive shock
never sells. We assume the more realistic situation in which an informed
agent need not have an (extreme) liquidity shock, that is, Pr(σt ∈ [−(x −
µ), µ− x]) > 0.
The equilibrium strategies of uninformed owners and an informed non-
owner are derived analogously. The uninformed owners submit limit orders
to sell at their reservation value,
askt = δ (xˇ + St+1 −Bt+1) , (8)
where xˇ = E(xt+1
∣∣ buy ) is the expected next dividend given that someone
submits a market order to buy. An informed non-owner submits a market
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order to buy if xt+1 + σt+1 ≥ xˇ, and otherwise he does not submit an order.
The equilibrium condition for xˇ is
xˇ = E
(
xt+1
∣∣ xt+1 + σt+1 ≥ xˇ ) , (9)
and existence of equilibrium follows from a simple application of Proposi-
tion 1.
Finally, we verify that the uninformed traders optimally submit limit
orders as specified above. It suffices to consider an uninformed owner. An
owner must do one of the following (i): submit a market order to sell, (ii)
submit a limit order to sell, and (iii) submit no order.
If an uninformed owner submits a market order, he is sure to sell his
share. If there is no other market order, he is selling at the bid price. If there
is a buy market order, then the owner is selling at the mid price. Intuitively,
this is an unprofitable strategy, since the owner is selling at a low price that
reflects the buyers’ fear of information-based sales, while the owner has no
adverse information. We provide a formal argument in the Appendix.
If the owner submits a limit order (higher than the bid), then he sells
only if his order is hit by a market order. If the owner’s order is hit, the
buyer must be an informed agent, and, therefore, the owner’s reservation
value is, as explained above, askt = δ (xˇ + St+1 −Bt+1). Hence, the owner’s
equilibrium action — a sell-limit order at the ask price — is indeed optimal.
(The owner is indifferent between this action, a greater limit order, or no
order at all.)
Proposition 2 summarizes the structure of equilibria with trade, and char-
acterizes the value functions.
Proposition 2 Suppose xˆ and xˇ solve (7) and (9), respectively. Then the
following strategies constitute an equilibrium. Uninformed non-owners and
owners submit limit orders at the bid (5) and ask (8), respectively. An in-
formed owner submits a market order to sell if xt+1 + σt+1 ≤ xˆ, and an
informed non-owner submits a market order to buy if xt+1 + σt+1 ≥ xˇ. The
value functions are given by
St =
T∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
µ + σ+ − cˆ
)
(10)
Bt =
T∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
σ+ − cˇ
)
, (11)
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where
σ+ =
1
N
E(σt 1(σt>0)) (12)
cˆ =
1
N
E
(
σt 1(σt>0 , xt+σt≤xˆ) − σt 1(σt<0 , xt+σt>xˆ)
)
(13)
cˇ =
1
N
E
(
σt 1(σt>0 , xt+σt<xˇ) − σt 1(σt<0 , xt+σt≥xˇ)
)
. (14)
The value of ownership is the expected present value of future dividends,
µ = E(xt), and efficient private benefits, σ
+, reduced by the present value
of future “allocation cost,” cˆ. The efficient private benefits stem from the
possibility of owning the asset when one has a special need for it, that is,
when σ > 0. The allocation cost is due to the possible mis-allocation of the
asset — namely, it may be held by an agent with a negative private value, or
may be sold by an agent with a positive private value. The former happens
when the owner has a need for cash and at the same time such good news
about the next dividend that he chooses not to sell. The latter happens
when an owner who has a special need for the asset simultaneously has bad
news about the next dividend. The value of being a non-owner comes from
the expected efficient private benefits, σ+ — buying when one has a special
need for the asset — reduced by the (buy-side) allocation cost, cˇ. The buy-
side allocation cost reflects the possibility that either of the following two
situations occurs: a non-owner has positive private value, but not a good
enough signal to induce purchase; a non-owner has negative private value,
but such a good signal that he buys anyway. In all the terms above, the factor
1/N represents the probability that a given owner, respectively non-owner,
will have a liquidity shock. These probabilities enter the price formula in the
same way in a more general model, in which several agents may be subject
to shocks. In particular, the effect of the allocation costs need not decrease
as the market size (N) increases, provided that the fraction of agents with
liquidity shocks stays constant.
Knowing the value functions, we can compute the equilibrium prices ex-
plicitly as
bidt = −δ(µ− xˆ) +
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tµ−
T∑
s=t+2
δs−t (cˆ− cˇ) (15)
askt = δ(xˇ− µ) +
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tµ−
T∑
s=t+2
δs−t (cˆ− cˇ) , (16)
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where xˇ ≤ µ ≤ xˆ. We compare the bid and ask prices to their counterparts
in a full-information economy. With full information, the bid and ask prices
are the same, and their expected value is
E
(
δxt+1 +
T∑
s=t+2
δs−tµ
)
=
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tµ . (17)
We note that private values are not priced in a competitive full-information
market since at most one agent has this private benefit and there are several
assets.15
The bid price differs from the average full-information price for two rea-
sons. First, there is a “lemons discount,” µ − xˆ > 0, because a market
order to sell may be due to bad news about the next dividend. Second, the
bid price is affected by the inefficient allocations that arise because of the
adverse-selection problem. It is noteworthy that the price is reduced by the
sell-side allocation cost — an owner pays less in anticipation of incurring
these costs — but increased by the buy-side allocation cost — an owner is
happy to pay more in order to avoid the buy-side allocation costs. The sign
of the effect depends on the distribution of (xt, σt).
The bid price contains just a single term related to the lemons discount,
and a whole series of allocation costs. To explain this, we consider an agent
buying an asset. How should he be compensated for the fact that he may be
selling the asset in the future at the bid price? Conditional on selling because
of a need for cash (σ < 0), the agent will be paid too little because of the
lemons discount. Conditional on selling for information reasons (σ ≥ 0),
however, he will be paid too much. In equilibrium these effects balance.
Therefore, future lemons discounts do not affect the current price directly.
The future adverse-selection problems do affect the agent, though, through
the allocation inefficiencies that they imply.
Similarly, the ask price is elevated by a “peach premium,” xˇ − µ > 0,
since a market order to buy may be caused by positive news about the asset.
Also, the ask price is affected by the allocation costs in the same way as the
bid price is.
The bid-ask spread, δ (xˇ− xˆ) > 0, is the difference between the lemons
discount and the peach premium, and is positive. In equilibrium, the bid-ask
spread does not, on average, impose a cost on the agent submitting a market
order: a buyer is paying a peach premium, but indeed getting a peach; a
15The full-information value functions are as in (10)–(11) with cˆ = cˇ = 0.
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seller receives a lemons discount, but indeed selling a lemon. The bid-ask
spread does, however, inhibit some efficient trades, and in this sense it is a
cost.
The case of symmetry is an interesting benchmark:
Proposition 3 Suppose xt and σt are symmetrically
16 distributed around
µ and 0, respectively. Then, there exists an equilibrium with cˆ = cˇ and
µ − xˆ = xˇ − µ. In this case, the mid price is equal to the average full-
information price, and has an expected return equal to the risk-free rate,
r = 1/δ − 1.
This proposition implies that if xt and σt are symmetrically distributed
around 0, then the mid price (1/2 bid + 1/2 ask) is the same as the aver-
age price with no asymmetric information, and at the same time there is a
strictly positive bid-ask spread. More generally, (15)–(16) show that whether
the full-information price is between the bid and ask prices depends on the
expected future allocation costs,
∑T
s=t+2 δ
s−t (cˆ− cˇ).
We can express our results in terms of the required rate of return. Be-
cause of the bid-ask spread, returns can be measured in various ways. A
particularly simple expression obtains if we consider the following weighted
average of the bid and ask prices: pt :=
xˇ−µ
xˇ−xˆ
bidt +
µ−xˆ
xˇ−xˆ
askt. The required rate
of return, measured in terms of pt, is
pt+1 + µ
pt
− 1 = r +
δ(cˆ− cˇ)
pt
, (18)
that is, the risk-free return r plus a premium related to the allocation costs.17
As discussed in the introduction, these results should be seen in contrast
to the literature on exogenous transactions costs,18 which finds that the price
of an asset should be reduced by the present value of all future trading
costs, or, equivalently, the required rate of return should be increased by the
amortized transactions costs. For stocks on the NYSE, the average bid-ask
16We say that a random variable, say xt, is symmetrically distributed around µ if xt−µ
and −(xt − µ) have the same distribution.
17Other ways of measuring the return are to some extent affected directly by the bid-ask
spread. In particular, the price pt := α bidt +(1−α) askt implies a return of
pt+1+µ
pt
− 1 =
r + δ(cˆ−cˇ)
pt
− r δ(α(xˇ−xˆ)−(xˇ−µ))
pt
. Note that the coefficient r on the bid-ask spread confers it
a second-order effect, unlike elsewhere in the literature.
18See Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1988), Constantinides (1986), Vayanos (1998),
Vayanos and Vila (1999), and others.
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spread is approximately 2.2%, and the average turnover is approximately
60%.19 Hence, this literature would suggest that the average required rate
of return should be increased by about 0.6 · 2.2% = 1.3% because of trading
costs, which would have a large impact on the level of prices. We find, on
the other hand, that if bid-ask spreads are generated (partly) by adverse
selection, then the price impact would be smaller than that. Hence, our
result might help explain the rather modest price impact associated with the
reduction in bid-ask spreads of about 40% that occurs when a stock changes
its exchange listing from Nasdaq to NYSE. See Barclay, Kandel, and Marx
(1998) and Elyasiani, Hauser, and Lauterbach (2000).
As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the difference between the excess
return that obtains with an exogenous bid-ask spreads (dashed line) and
with the endogenous spread implied by our model (solid line). To make this
graph, we vary the dividend uncertainty and, for each level of uncertainty, we
compute the bid-ask spread and required excess return in our model. Further,
we calculate the excess returns implied by an exogenous bid-ask spread of
the same magnitude and with the same trading frequency as implied by our
model. We assume that one model period is half a month, but we annualize
the excess returns.
[ FIGURE 2 HERE ]
3 Extensions
We consider three extensions of the basic model. We study models with
multiple types of investors, with both informational costs and fixed costs of
trading, and with risk-averse agents.
3.1 Multiple Investor Types
The analysis of Section 2 relied on the assumption of symmetric agents. A
key implication of symmetry is that the lemons discount received by a seller
is consistent with his chance of selling on bad news. If the seller is less likely
to be informed than the average trader, however, then this is no longer true.
Hence, differences in investors’ chances of receiving information or liquidity
shocks may have pricing implications. This section shows that the required
19These numbers are from Chalmers and Kadlec (1998).
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return is elevated by the marginal investor’s expected trading losses to the
better informed investors.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that every period
owners receive a dividend; then agents trade; then an agent receives infor-
mation; and finally agents may trade again. The difference from Section 1
is the additional round of trading, preceding the acquisition of information.
This round (which can be allowed in the basic model without any changes,
since it would not be used) is introduced here to avoid the complication of
time variation in the likelihood that a sale is made by one type or another.
The intuition we want to capture does not concern the variation in these
likelihoods.
There are 2 types of investors, N1 investors of type 1, and N2 investors
of type 2, and hence a total of N = N1 +N2 investors. (This can be general-
ized to more investor types.) In any period, t, one randomly chosen investor
receives private information, xt+1 ∈ [x, x] about the dividend next period.
If the chosen agent is of type 2, then he also receives a private signal, σt+1,
reflecting his liquidity need as in the basic model, that is, his utility for hold-
ing this period is xt+1 + σt+1. All liquidity shocks are negative: σt+1 ≤ 0.
(In effect, this convenient simplifying assumption restricts attention to the
adverse-selection problem faced by sellers, while capturing the intuition.)
Type-1 investors never have liquidity shocks, and therefore they have a com-
parative advantage in holding the asset.20 Hence, if there are more type-1
investors than assets, then only these investors participate in the market,
and we are back to the model of section 2. Here, we assume that there are
fewer type-1 agents than assets, or, more precisely, that 0 < N1 < K − 1.
The following strategies constitute an equilibrium. In the first round of
trading of any period t, owners of type i submit orders to sell at their reserva-
tion value, Sit−B
i
t, where S
i
t and B
i
t are the reservation values of owners and
non-owners, respectively, of type i. Type-2 non-owners submit limit orders
to buy for S2t −B
2
t , and type-1 non-owners submit market orders to buy. The
bid, ask, and clearing prices all equal S2t −B
2
t , and after this round of trade,
all type-1 agents own an asset (which is the purpose of introducing the first
round of trading).
In the second round of trade, agents have asymmetric information. Unin-
formed type-2 non-owners submit limit orders to buy a share at their reser-
20It is straightforward to allow agents to also differ in their likelihood of being informed.
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vation value,
bidt = δ
(
xˆ + S2t+1 −B
2
t+1
)
, (19)
where xˆ = E(xt+1
∣∣ sale).
An owner with bad news or a liquidity need sells his asset. More precisely,
an informed type-1 agent sells if xt+1 ≤ xˆ, and an informed type-2 agent sells
if xt+1 + σt+1 ≤ xˆ. Hence, the equilibrium condition is
xˆ = γE(xt
∣∣ xt ≤ xˆ) + (1− γ)E(xt ∣∣ xt + σt ≤ xˆ),
where
γ = Pr(sale by type 1
∣∣ sale)
=
N1Pr(xt ≤ xˆ)
N1Pr(xt ≤ xˆ) + (K −N1)Pr(xt + σt ≤ xˆ)
.
Naturally, the lemons discount is the weighted average of the adverse selection
associated with sales by agents of type 1 and 2, respectively. The weights
reflect the relative likelihood that a sale is initiated by each type of agents.
The assumption σt ≤ 0 means that there are no liquidity reasons to
buy, and, therefore, agents assume that possible buy orders are motivated
by private information. Hence, an uninformed owner of type i submits a
limit order to sell at her reservation value, δ
(
x + Sit+1 −B
i
t+1
)
, given the
best possible signal, x, about the next dividend.
These considerations show the following.
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium described above, the bid and ask prices
are:
bidt = −δ(µ− xˆ) +
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tµ−
T∑
s=t+2
δs−t
(
cˆ + θ[ˆˆx− xˆ]
)
askt = δ(x− µ) +
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tµ−
T∑
s=t+2
δs−t
(
cˆ + θ[ˆˆx− xˆ]
)
,
where cˆ = −E(σt 1(xt+σt>xˆ))/N is the allocation cost for type-2 agents, θ =
Pr(xt + σt ≤ xˆ)/N is their probability of submitting a market order to sell,
and ˆˆx = E(xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ xˆ).
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The prices are as in the basic model except for the last term involving ˆˆx−xˆ >
0. This last term is due to the fact that the “marginal” (type-2) investor
on average is paid too little when he is selling. Conditional on a type-2
investor selling, the expected dividend is ˆˆx. Buyers do not know, however,
if a sale is initiated by a type-2 investor. Buyers know that a sale could
also be initiated by a type-1 agent, in which case the expected dividend is
E(xt|xt ≤ xˆ). Hence, the lemons discount, xˆ, (in the bid price) reflects the
average adverse selection over sales by type 1 and 2 agents. Therefore, the
part ˆˆx − xˆ = γ(E[x
∣∣ x + σ < xˆ] − E[x ∣∣ x < xˆ]) of the lemons costs,
which is due to the adverse selection related to the inframarginal owners, is
a cost to the marginal investor. The prices are reduced by the present value
of all these future trading costs, or, equivalently, the required rate of return
is increased by δθ(ˆˆx− xˆ)/pt.
It is instructive to consider the two polar cases. On one hand, if type-1
investors suffer from the same liquidity shocks as type-2 investors, then ˆˆx = xˆ
and the lemons discount translates into no trading cost. On the other hand,
if the marginal investor is never informed, then the entire lemons discount,
µ− xˆ, is a trading cost to him, and consequently all future lemons discounts
are priced, that is, ˆˆx− xˆ = µ− xˆ.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) also consider (in their Section 4), the re-
quired return if some agents are never informed, while other agents are
informed. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that an uninformed investor
requires an additional return equal to his expected losses to the informed
traders. In their analysis it is puzzling, however, that the market maker,
who does not lose to the informed, requires the same return as the unin-
formed, and further puzzling that the informed trader requires this return.
We strengthen the result in three ways: (i) by deriving it in a model in
which all agents solve well-defined dynamic problems, (ii) by showing how it
depends on the (ex ante) differences among agents, and (iii) by showing how
required returns are, additionally, affected by allocation costs.
3.2 Fixed Costs
In this section, we study how the presence of fixed trading costs affects ad-
verse selection. These costs can be due to order processing costs, search
costs, or rents extracted by the market maker.
Suppose that agents must pay a fixed transaction cost, c, when they buy
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or sell. Then the bid and ask prices are
bidt = δ (xˆ− c + St+1 −Bt+1) (20)
askt = δ (xˇ + c + St+1 −Bt+1) , (21)
where xˆ and xˇ are the expected next dividend conditional on a market order
to sell or buy, respectively, with equilibrium conditions
xˆ = E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ xˆ− 2c)
xˇ = E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≥ xˆ + 2c) .
(Proposition 1 gives conditions for existence of equilibrium by letting σt± 2c
play the role of σt.) The value functions are now
St =
T∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
µ + σ+ − cˆ− θˆ2c
)
(22)
Bt =
T∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
σ+ − cˇ− θˇ2c
)
, (23)
where θˆ and θˇ are the probabilities of submitting a market order to sell or
buy, respectively,
θˆ =
1
N
Pr (xt + σt ≤ xˆ− 2c)
θˇ =
1
N
Pr (xt + σt ≥ xˇ + 2c) ,
and where σ+ is given in (12), and cˆ, and cˇ are defined analogously to (13)–
(14).
The value functions together with (20)–(21) lead to the following con-
clusions: First, adverse selection is priced as in the basic model in that it
increases the bid-ask spread and changes the level of prices through its alloca-
tion effects. Second, fixed trading costs directly increase the bid-ask spread,
and also change the level of prices through the present value of all future
trading costs.21
21Future trading costs reduce prices through a series of terms of the form (θˆ − θˇ)2c.
The reason that future costs, θˇ2c, associated with buying an asset tend to elevate prices
is as follows: At some future point in time, an agent may need to own the asset and if he
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We note that the equilibrium volume of trade shrinks as c increases, con-
sistent with the findings of Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos (1998). Also,
changes in the fixed transaction cost change the severity of the adverse-
selection problem. Higher fixed costs change the average quality of the sold
asset, that is, change the lemons cost, xˆ, and lead to greater allocation inef-
ficiencies.
3.3 Risk Aversion
In this section we show that our main results apply in in the presence of risk
aversion, in a particular setting. While the setting is special, it illustrates
that our results do not hold only in the case of risk neutrality, and helps
demonstrate what is needed for our results.
We assume that agents are risk-averse with respect to the cash flows
of the illiquid assets, with common von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion, u( · ). Further, we assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect
to payments associated with trading the asset. The best interpretation of
these preferences is an economy with two goods: houses and apples (the nu-
meraire). If one owns a house, then one must consume its random service
flows immediately. Hence, agents are risk-averse with respect to these service
flows. There is a perfect market for apples, which can be invested, and since
prices are deterministic, the agents face no risk with respect to the terms of
trade for consumption of apples. Similarly, Grossman and Laroque (1990)
study an economy with assets that yield service flows that must be consumed
immediately. These preferences are captured by the following utility func-
tion (which replaces Equation (1)) for consumption, xs + σs, of housing, and
consumption, zis, of apples:
Πit(A
1, . . . , AN ) =
E
[ T∑
s=t+1
δs−t u
(
(xs + σs 1(i=I(s−1)))1(i∈Os)
)
−
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tzis
∣∣∣∣ F it
]
,
The equilibrium of the economy with these preferences is derived similarly
owns it already, he will save the costs of buying it. In the overlapping-generations (OLG)
models of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Vayanos (1998), agents are born, buy, hold,
sell, and then die. This corresponds most closely to our model with θˇ = 0, and in this
case our model delivers the same result as the OLG models: The price is reduced by the
present value of all future fixed costs incurred.
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to the equilibrium in the basic model, so we report only the resulting prices:
bidt = −δ(u¯− uˆ) +
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tu¯−
T∑
s=t+2
δs−t (cˆ− cˇ)
askt = δ(uˇ− u¯) +
T∑
s=t+1
δs−tu¯−
T∑
s=t+2
δs−t (cˆ− cˇ) ,
where
u¯ = E (u(xt))
uˆ = E
(
u(xt)
∣∣∣ u(xt + σt) ≤ uˆ)
uˇ = E
(
u(xt)
∣∣∣ u(xt + σt) ≥ uˇ)
cˆ =
1
N
E([u(xt)− u(xt + σt)] 1(σt<0 , u(xt+σt)>uˆ)
+[u(xt + σt)− u(xt)] 1(σt>0 , u(xt+σt)≤uˆ))
cˇ =
1
N
E([u(xt)− u(xt + σt)] 1(σt<0 , u(xt+σt)≥uˇ)
+[u(xt + σt)− u(xt)] 1(σt>0 , u(xt+σt)<uˇ)).
These prices are seen to have the same structure as in the basic model with
risk-neutral agents. The effect of risk aversion is that the limit orders involve
the certainty equivalent of the next dividend, not the expected dividend, since
investors want to be compensated for bearing risk. This is not on average
a cost for the informed agent, though, for he is as risk-averse as the other
agents, and therefore happy to pay for the implicit insurance provided by the
fact that the price does not depend on his information about the dividend.
As in the risk-neutral model, the price levels are reduced by the present value
of future allocation costs.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies how adverse selection affects the required return. It shows
that the required return is affected by the allocation costs associated with
adverse selection, and by the bid-ask spread only to the extent that the
marginal investor is (ex ante) less likely to be informed than better informed
investors.
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There are several limitations to our model. First, agents are restricted
to own zero or one unit of the asset. While it seems reasonable that agents
can take only limited positions, it is restrictive to assume that agents have
no quantity decision within their limits. Intuitively, our results seem also to
apply when investors can trade different quantities, but it might be valuable
to extend the model to encompass this possibility. This extension would
be especially promising if combined with a relaxation of the assumption of
exogenous financial distress. In that case, one could imagine that a large
security position would be associated with some combination of a high risk
of liquidity need and severe illiquidity costs.
Further, we consider only one class of illiquid assets. It would be interest-
ing to consider the asset pricing effects of dynamic trading between multiple
classes of illiquid assets.
In our setting, the structure of asymmetric information can easily be made
endogenous; that is, the quality of privately learned information can depend
on ownership status. The information structure can be further endogenized
by assuming that agents must pay for information. In such a generalization,
it would indeed be the case (in equilibrium) that the amount of information
purchased would depend on ownership, and new implications may arise from
studying this endogenous adverse-selection problem.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) Define f : R → [x, x] by
f(y) = E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ y ) , (A.1)
where E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ y ) is defined as x for y such that Pr(xt +σt ≤ y ) =
0. First, we note that f is continuous because the absolute continuity of
xt implies that Pr(xt + σt = y ) = 0 for all y, and because of dominated
convergence. Second, there exists a y such that y > f(y) since f(y) →
E(xt) < ∞ as y → ∞. Third, f(x) ≥ x. Hence, existence of a solution to
(7) follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem.
(ii) This part of the proposition follows from the fact that f(y) ≤ E(xt)
for all y. To see that, we note that y 7→ E
(
xt
∣∣ xt ≤ y ) is increasing toward
E(xt). Further,
f(y) =
∫
E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σ ≤ y )F (dσ ∣∣ xt + σt ≤ y), (A.2)
where F (·
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ y) is the distribution of σt conditional on xt + σt ≤ y,
and where the integrand is bounded by E(xt).
(iii) First, if Pr(σt < 0) > 0, then f(x) > x, which implies that a solution
to (7) is greater than x. Second, if Pr(σt ≥ 0) = 1 then for any y > x,
f(y) ≤ E
(
xt
∣∣ xt ≤ y ) < y.
where the first inequality follows from (A.2), and the second inequality is
obvious.
(iv) We note that f(µ) = µ if and only if E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σ ≤ µ ) = µ
for almost all σ with respect to the measure F (·
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ µ). (See the
discussion in (ii).) Further, E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σ ≤ y ) = µ if and only if y−σ ≥ x.
Finally, the support of F (·
∣∣ xt +σt ≤ µ) is always contained in (−∞, µ−x].
Hence, f(µ) = µ if and only if Pr(σt ∈ (−∞,−(x − µ)]) > 0 and Pr(σt ∈
(−(x− µ), µ− x]) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We first complete the proof that the agents’ strategies form an equilibrium,
by verifying that uninformed traders do not submit market orders. We dis-
tinguish three cases.
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(a) The informed trader is also an owner, so that the uninformed seller
receives δ(xˆ + S − B), the bid price, for an asset with conditional
expected value δ(µ + S − B); thus the seller makes an expected profit
of δ(xˆ− µ) < 0.
(b) The informed trader is not an owner and does not buy, a case in which
the uninformed makes an expected conditional profit of
δ
(
xˆ− E
(
x
∣∣ x + σ < xˇ)) < δ (xˆ− E (x ∣∣ x + σ < xˆ)) = 0.
The inequality owes to xˇ > xˆ and to the fact that the density of σ
being log-concave implies that x and x + σ are affiliated.
(c) The informed trader is a buyer, and the uninformed makes δ((xˆ+xˇ)/2−
xˇ) = δ(xˆ− xˇ)/2 < 0.
Thus, conditional on being in any of the three cases, a market order is asso-
ciated with an expected loss.
It remains to derive the value functions. Since
St = E
(
δ
[
xt+1 + σt+11(i=I(t)) + St+1
]
1(i keeps asset)
+ [Pt + δBt+1] 1(i sells)
)
= δ(µ + σ+ − cˆ + St+1),
and
Bt = E
([
δ(xt+1 + σt+11(i=I(t)) + St+1)− Pt
]
1(i buys)
+δBt+1 1(i does not buy)
)
= δ(σ+ − cˇ + Bt+1),
we get (10)–(11) by recursion. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
By Proposition 1 there exists a number, xˆ, that solves (7). Define xˇ such
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that xˇ− µ = µ− xˆ. Then,
xˇ− µ = µ− E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≤ xˆ )
= µ− E
(
xt
∣∣ −(xt − µ + σt) ≥ µ− xˆ )
= E
(
−(xt − µ)
∣∣ −(xt − µ + σt) ≥ xˇ− µ )
= E
(
xt − µ
∣∣ xt − µ + σt ≥ xˇ− µ )
= E
(
xt
∣∣ xt + σt ≥ xˇ )− µ .
Further,
N (σ+ − cˆ) = E(σt 1(xt−µ+σt>xˆ−µ))
= −E(−σt 1(−(xt−µ+σt)<xˇ−µ))
= −E(σt 1(xt+σt<xˇ))
= E(σt)− E(σt 1(xt+σt<xˇ))
= E(σt 1(xt+σt≥xˇ))
= N (σ+ − cˇ).

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Figure 1: Time-line for period t.
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Figure 2: The solid line shows our information-based model’s implied excess
return for varying levels of dividend uncertainty (v), while the dashed line
shows the excess return based on the same trading frequency and bid-ask
spread, but treating the spread and trading decision as exogenous. The
model period is half a month, the parameters are T = ∞, δ = exp(−0.10/24),
x ∼ u([0.42 − v, 0.42 + v]), σ ∼ u([−0.83, 0.13]), N = 13, K = 4, and the
returns are annualized by multiplying by 24.
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